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Abstract
The usual theory of prediction with expert advice does not di*erentiate between good and bad
“experts”: its typical results only assert that it is possible to e.ciently merge not too extensive
pools of experts, no matter how good or how bad they are. On the other hand, it is natural to
expect that good experts’ predictions will in some way agree with the actual outcomes (e.g., they
will be accurate on the average). In this paper we show that, in the case of the Brier prediction
game (also known as the square-loss game), the predictions of a good (in some weak and
natural sense) expert must satisfy the law of large numbers (both strong and weak) and the law
of the iterated logarithm; we also show that two good experts’ predictions must be in asymptotic
agreement. To help the reader’s intuition, we give a Kolmogorov-complexity interpretation of
our results. Finally, we brie8y discuss possible extensions of our results to more general games;
the limit theorems for sequences of events in conventional probability theory correspond to the
log-loss game. c© 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Kolmogorov complexity; Limit theorems of probability theory; Prediction with
expert advice
1. Introduction
There is a substantial body of work in computational learning theory (starting from
Littlestone and Warmuth [12]) devoted to the problem of combining predictions given
by a pool of experts. The usual goal is to ?nd a merging strategy for the learner
whose losses would be almost as small as the losses of the best expert. It was realized,
however, that another interesting goal for the learner is to perform better than the best
expert. For example, Littlestone et al. [11] (whose work was continued by, among
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others, Cesa-Bianchi et al. [2] and Kivinen and Warmuth [9]) considered the problem
of performing almost as well as the best linear combination of the experts. Another
example is the work by Herbster and Warmuth [8], where the goal for the learner is to
“track” the best expert. In both cases, however, it can be argued that the learner’s goal
is the old one, performing almost as well as the best expert in the pool, but applied
to a bigger pool of experts: in the case of comparing the learner to the best linear
combination of the experts, we can consider the pool consisting of all linear combina-
tions of the old experts (see, e.g., [22]); and in the case of tracking the best expert,
we can consider a pool containing “composite experts” who replicate the predictions
of an original expert and are allowed to occasionally switch to a di*erent expert (see
[21]). In this paper we will consider a situation where the goal of performing better
than the best expert cannot be reduced to the old goal of performing almost as well
as the best expert. It is interesting that, as opposed to most of the previous work,
we will obtain non-trivial results even in the case where the pool consists of a single
expert.
To motivate our de?nitions, we ?rst consider the following simple example. In the
morning of day t (t=1; 2; : : :) an expert predicts whether or not it will rain that day; her
predictions t are allowed to take values in the interval [0; 1] (with t =1 interpreted as
“de?nitely rain”, t =0 as “de?nitely no rain”, and t ∈ ]0; 1[ as the degree of con?dence
in the event “rain today”). After the outcome !t ∈{0; 1} of the event “rain” is disclosed
by Nature (with !t =1 coding “rain” and !t =0 “no rain”), the expert su*ers a loss
of (!t − t)2 (this is the “Brier loss function” popular in meteorology). Suppose the
expert’s mean error
1
T
T∑
t=1
(!t − t) (1)
does not tend to 0 as T →∞. Do we have any grounds to assert that her performance
has been unsatisfactory? By the usual strong law of large numbers we can conclude
that t are not the true probabilities (conditional on the past) of !t =1, but the expert
can still claim that her performance has been good and that nobody else would have
performed better; there is no way to falsify this claim within the framework of the
traditional probability theory. This problem can be solved, however, using the tech-
niques of the theory of prediction with expert advice: it turns out that there exists a
simple strategy for transforming the expert’s predictions t which ensures the following:
either
1
T
T∑
t=1
(!t − t)→ 0 (T →∞)
or
T∑
t=1
(!t − t)2 −
T∑
t=1
(!t − Lt )2 →∞ (T →∞);
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where Lt are the transformed predictions (see Theorem 2 below). In other words,
either the expert will be right on the average or she will perform in?nitely worse than
a simple strategy.
The previous example can be interpreted as a worst-case version of the strong law
of large numbers; later on (in Section 4) we also state and prove a worst-case version
of the law of the iterated logarithm. One more interesting result is the worst-case
“theorem of agreement” (Theorem 8 below). Suppose we now have two experts who
give predictions (1)t and 
(2)
t for rain today. The theorem of agreement implies the
existence of a (very simple) strategy for transforming (1)t and 
(2)
t which ensures that
at least one of the following three events eventually happens:
(1)t − (2)t → 0 (t →∞)
or
T∑
t=1
(
!t − (1)t
)2
−
T∑
t=1
(
!t − Lt
)2 →∞ (T →∞)
or
T∑
t=1
(
!t − (2)t
)2
−
T∑
t=1
(
!t − Lt
)2 →∞ (T →∞);
where Lt are the transformed predictions. In other words, either the experts’ predictions
will be in agreement or at least one of the experts will perform in?nitely worse than
that strategy.
It is not immediately clear how all these results are related to algorithmic learning.
Actually, the transformation strategy used in the proof of the theorem of agreement
(see Section 8.8) is so simple that it hardly deserves to be called a learning strategy.
However, in the case of the worst-case strong law of large numbers (and even more
so in the case of the worst-case law of the iterated logarithm) non-trivial learning is
needed. The idea of the proof (given in Section 8.2) is as follows. If the expert is
not correct on the average, we could try to “recalibrate” her predictions by adding a
constant  (positive or negative). The obvious problem is that we do not know a priori
which value of  to choose. Using a learning algorithm which we call the Aggregating
Algorithm [18, 20] allows us to home in on the right . For the law of the iterated
logarithm the idea is similar (though more di.cult to implement).
In Section 7, we restate these results (strong law of large numbers, law of the
iterated logarithm, and theorem of agreement) in terms of a natural modi?cation of
Kolmogorov complexity.
This paper occasionally uses some basic notions of the theory of martingales. Ex-
cellent reviews are by Shiryayev [15] and Williams [24]; however, no knowledge of
this theory is required for understanding the main ideas of this paper.
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2. Main denitions
Let  (the outcome space) and 	 (the prediction space) be two sets, 
 :  × 	 →
[0;∞] be a non-negative function (the loss function), and n be a positive integer (the
number of experts). These elements de?ne the following perfect-information game
(called “game (;	; 
) with n experts”) between Learner, Nature, and a pool of experts
which consists of Expert 1; : : : ; Expert n:
for t=1; 2; : : :
for i=1; : : : ; n
Expert i chooses prediction (i)t ∈	
end for
Learner chooses his own prediction Lt ∈	
Nature chooses outcome !t ∈
end for
(cf., e.g., [20]). Typically, Learner is considered to be playing against all other players.
At every trial t Expert i, i=1; : : : ; n, and Learner su*er loss 
(!t; 
(i)
t ) and 
(!t; Lt ),
respectively. Our notation for the total loss su*ered by Expert i and Learner over the
?rst T trials will be
LossT (Expert i) =
T∑
t=1

(!t; 
(i)
t )
and
LossT (Learner) =
T∑
t=1

(!t; Lt );
respectively. A play of the game is a sequence of players’ moves:
((1)1 ; : : : ; 
(n)
1 ; 
L
1 ; !1; 
(1)
2 ; : : : ; 
(n)
2 ; 
L
2 ; !2; : : :): (2)
To state our results, we need an explication of the notion of a good expert. We want
as weak a de?nition as possible (to make our results as strong as possible), so we will
use “adequate” as a technical term.
Denition 1. Expert i, i=1; : : : ; n, is adequate for a play (2) of the game (;	; 
)
with n experts if
lim inf
T→∞
(LossT (Expert i)− LossT (Learner)) ¡∞
(notice that both LossT (Expert i) and LossT (Learner) implicitly depend on (2)).
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In other words, Expert i is not adequate (or is inadequate) if her performance is
in?nitely worse than that of Learner:
LossT (Expert i)− LossT (Learner)→∞ (T →∞):
We will use the expression “good expert” informally, meaning that a good expert will
be at least adequate for the actual play. For the interpretation of our results, it is helpful
to assume that Experts and Nature are oblivious, in the sense that their moves do not
depend on Learner’s moves.
In this paper, we will be mainly interested in the Brier game (;	; 
), for which
 = 	 = [0; 1]; 
(!; ) = (!− )2
(since we allow outcomes 0¡!¡1, this de?nition goes slightly beyond our mete-
orological interpretation in Section 1). For the purpose of comparison, we will also
consider the log-loss game (;	; 
), for which
 = {0; 1}; 	 = [0; 1]; 
(!; ) =
{− ln  if ! = 1;
− ln(1− ) otherwise:
3. Strong law of large numbers
In this section and the next one we will consider games with only one expert, n=1,
calling Expert 1 just Expert and writing t instead of 
(1)
t . We say that Learner can
guarantee a property  of play (2) if he has a strategy which guarantees that, whatever
moves Nature and Expert(s) choose, the resulting play will satisfy . (We will also
use the phrase “Expert and Nature can guarantee” some property, in the analogous
sense.) If Expert is good at predicting Nature’s moves !t , we expect that she will be
right on the average:
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
(!t − t) = 0: (3)
In other words, we expect that a strong law of large numbers will hold. The following
result substantiates this expectation.
Theorem 2. Learner can guarantee the following implication in the Brier game:
Expert is adequate⇒ lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
(!t − t) = 0: (4)
To put it di*erently, there exists Learner’s strategy which guarantees that (3) holds
whenever Expert is adequate. Equivalently, Expert whose predictions fail to be correct
on the average will be greatly outperformed by Learner.
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Remark 3. Actually the statement of the theorem implies the following seemingly
stronger assertion: for any ¿0, Learner has a strategy which guarantees that, for
every T ,
LossT (Learner)6LossT (Expert) + 
and that, whenever (3) is violated
lim
T→∞
(LossT (Expert)− LossT (Learner)) =∞:
Similar remarks can be made about most of the theorems in this paper.
Next, we will describe the connection of the usual strong law of large numbers
for sequences of events with the log-loss game. The former is closely related to (but
slightly weaker than) the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Learner can guarantee (4) in the log-loss game.
(Notice how this theorem is di*erent from the classical variants of the strong law
of large numbers such as Borel’s theorem: the classical variants are concerned with
almost certain events whereas our result is about the worst-case scenario.)
To deduce Borel’s strong law of large numbers from Theorem 4, let P be a probabil-
ity distribution in {0; 1}∞ (with the usual -algebra). Consider the following strategy
E for Expert in the log-loss game: after observing a sequence !1 : : : !T of Nature’s
moves, Expert predicts with the conditional probability
T+1 =
P(!1 : : : !T1)
P(!1 : : : !T )
(with the uncertainty 00 resolved to, say,
1
2 ). Theorem 4 asserts that there exists
Learner’s strategy L that guarantees (4). For every ?nite sequence !1 : : : !T of
Nature’s moves put
S(!1 : : : !T ) = exp(LossT (Expert)− LossT (Learner));
where it is assumed that Nature’s moves are !1 : : : !T , Expert plays E, and Learner
plays L. Then S is a non-negative martingale with respect to P which tends to in?nity
outside event (3). Since non-negative martingales are convergent with probability 1
(by Doob’s theorem), (3) is P-almost certain (which is the martingale generalization
of Borel’s strong law).
4. Law of the iterated logarithm
Theorem 2 is an assertion about the convergence of (1=T )
∑T
t=1(!t − t) to 0. The
following theorem gives an estimate of the speed of this convergence.
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Theorem 5. Learner can guarantee the following implication in the Brier game:
Expert is adequate⇒ lim sup
T→∞
∣∣∣∣∣
∑T
t=1(!t − t)√
T ln ln T
∣∣∣∣∣6 1√2 :
The speed of convergence given by this theorem is actually optimal: the constant
1√
2
cannot be improved.
Theorem 6. Expert and Nature can guarantee the conjunction
Expert is adequate & lim inf
T→∞
∑T
t=1(!t − t)√
T ln ln T
= − 1√
2
;
& lim sup
T→∞
∑T
t=1(!t − t)√
T ln ln T
=
1√
2
in the Brier game.
The proof is given in Section 8; the statement of the theorem, however, is made
plausible by the following simple observation: when t = 12 , for all t, and Nature is
“obedient” in that it generates only 0’s and 1’s independently with equal probabilities,
then the usual law of the iterated logarithm shows that
lim inf
T→∞
∑T
t=1(!t − t)√
T ln ln T
= − 1√
2
; lim sup
T→∞
∑T
t=1(!t − t)√
T ln ln T
=
1√
2
almost surely.
For the log-loss game Learner can guarantee an equality; more accurately,
Theorem 7. Learner can guarantee the following implication in the log-loss game:
(Expert is adequate and DT →∞ as T →∞)
⇒ −
√
2 = lim inf
T→∞
∑T
t=1(!t − t)√
DT ln lnDT
6 lim sup
T→∞
∑T
t=1(!t − t)√
DT ln lnDT
=
√
2;
where DT =
∑T
t=1 t(1− t).
Of course, Theorem 5 ceases to be true if “6” is replaced by “=” (it su.ces to
consider the following strategies for Expert and Nature: both always choose 12 ).
Again Theorem 7 easily implies the usual martingale law of the iterated logarithm
for sequences of events.
5. Theorem of agreement
In this section we consider the Brier game with two experts. If both experts are good
at predicting Nature’s moves !t , it is natural to expect that the agreement property
lim
t→∞ (
(1)
t − (2)t ) = 0 (5)
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will hold (see, e.g., [16, 4]). Our ?rst task will be to show that the following elaboration
of (5) holds for good experts:
∞∑
t=1
(
(1)t − (2)t
)2
¡∞: (6)
Theorem 8. Learner can guarantee the following implication in the Brier game:
Experts 1 and 2 are adequate⇒
∞∑
t=1
(
(1)t − (2)t
)2
¡∞:
In other words, if the experts’ predictions fail to agree in the sense of (6), at least
one of them will be greatly outperformed by Learner.
For the log-loss game the methods of Vovk [17] allow us to prove
Theorem 9. Learner can guarantee the following implication in the log-loss game:
Experts 1 and 2 are adequate⇒
∞∑
t=1
H
(
(1)t ; 
(2)
t
)
¡∞;
where H is the Hellinger distance:
H(p; q) = (
√
p−√q)2 + (
√
1− p−
√
1− q)2:
For the log-loss game the conclusion that the sum of the Hellinger distance between
good experts’ predictions converges is in some sense the strongest possible (see [17]);
it turns out (Theorem 23 below) that condition (6) is the strongest possible (in the
same sense) in the Brier game.
6. Weak law of large numbers
All results we have stated so far are asymptotic: they assert something about in8nite
outcome sequences. It has been argued, however, that such results are not interesting
because we never observe in?nite sequences. In this section we state a simple result
about ?nite outcome sequences, considering games that last only T ¡∞ trials, where
T is a positive integer constant. (This is the simplest variant of the weak law of large
numbers; a natural generalization would be to replace the ?xed number T of trials by a
stopping time.) For such ?nite-horizon games, a play is a sequence of players’ moves
during the trials 1; : : : ; T :(
(1)1 ; : : : ; 
(n)
1 ; 
L
1 ; !1; : : : ; 
(1)
T ; : : : ; 
(n)
T ; 
L
T ; !T
)
: (7)
Denition 10. Let C be a positive constant and T be a positive integer constant. Expert
i, i=1; : : : ; n, is C-adequate for a play (7) of the game (;	; 
) of duration T if
LossT (Expert i)− LossT (Learner)6C:
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Now we can state a variant of the weak law of large numbers for the Brier game.
Theorem 11. Let C be a positive constant and T be integer. Learner can guarantee
the following implication in the Brier game of duration T with one expert:
Expert is C-adequate⇒
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
(!t − t)
∣∣∣∣∣6
√
C + ln 2=2
T
:
For comparison, we also state an elaboration of the usual weak law of large numbers
for sequences of events (see, e.g., [1, Theorem 1:1] and its elaboration, Eq. (1:18)).
Theorem 12. Let C be a positive constant and T be integer. Learner can guarantee
the following implication in the log-loss game of duration T with one expert:
Expert is C-adequate⇒
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
(!t − t)
∣∣∣∣∣612
√
eC
T
:
7. Kolmogorov-complexity interpretation
In this section we will generalize Levin’s modi?cation of Kolmogorov complexity
and Martin-LRof’s notion of randomness to a wide class of prediction games including
the Brier game. Within our framework, Levin’s and Martin-LRof’s de?nitions describe
complexity and randomness in the log-loss game. For the details of the theory of
Kolmogorov complexity, the reader can consult Li and Vitanyi [10].
We will assume that the sets  and 	 are equipped with some computability structure
that allows one to speak of, say, computable functions on ×	 (in our examples this
somewhat vague assumption will be obviously satis?ed). The loss function 
 is assumed
to be computable.
Let S be a prediction strategy, i.e., a function that maps every ?nite sequence
!1 : : : !T of outcomes into a prediction S(!1 : : : !T )∈	. In this section, our notation
for the total loss incurred over the ?rst T trials by Learner who follows S will be
LossS(!1 : : : !T ), where !1 : : : !T are the realized outcomes. The function LossS()
of a ?nite sequence ∈∗ is called the loss process of S; a real-valued function on
∗ is a loss process if it coincides with LossS for some prediction strategy S. Notice
that a function M : ∗ → [0;∞] is a loss process if and only if
∀ ∈ ∗ ∃ ∈ 	 ∀! ∈  : M ( ∗ !) = M () + 
(!; );
where  ∗ ! is  extended by adding one more element ! on the right.
We are interested in the loss processes corresponding to computable prediction strate-
gies; for the usual games (such as the log-loss or Brier game) these are exactly the
computable loss processes. It would be ideal for our purpose of de?ning algorithmic
notions of complexity and randomness if the class of computable loss processes con-
tained a smallest (say, to within an additive constant) element. Unfortunately, for the
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interesting loss functions such a smallest element does not exist: given a computable
prediction strategy S, it is easy to construct a computable prediction strategy that
greatly outperforms S on at least one outcome sequence. Levin, developing ideas
of Kolmogorov, suggested (for the special case of the log-loss game) the following
solution to the problem of non-existence of a smallest computable loss process.
Denition 13. A function M : ∗ → [0;∞] is a loss superprocess if
∀ ∈ ∗ ∃ ∈ 	 ∀! ∈  : M ( ∗ !)¿M () + 
(!; ): (8)
It is upper semicomputable if there exists a computable sequence of computable func-
tions Mi : ∗ → [0;∞] such that, for every ∈∗, M ()= inf i Mi().
The notion of a loss superprocess is closely related to the notions of supermartin-
gale and submartingale (especially when the conventional foundations of probability
theory are replaced by the game-theoretic foundations; cf. [14, Chapter 12, 5, 19]. We
have chosen the pre?x “super” because both supermartingales and loss superprocesses
describe situations where Learner (or the bettor) can su*er “unfair” extra losses.
Denition 14. The game (;	; 
) is a Levin game if there exists a smallest, to within
an additive constant, upper semicomputable loss superprocess M . (In other words, M
is an upper semicomputable loss superprocess such that for any other upper semi-
computable loss superprocess N there exists a constant C such that sup∈∗(M () −
N ()) ¡∞.) Such M is called a 
-universal loss superprocess.
Levin proved the existence of a log-loss universal loss superprocess and used it to
give an alternative de?nition of randomness in the sense of Martin-LRof. (The log-loss
universal loss superprocess is the logarithm of Levin’s a priori semimeasure.) It is
shown in [23] that a wide class of games, including the log-loss game and Brier game,
are Levin games. (The idea is to apply the Aggregating Algorithm, see Theorem 24
below, to a universal computable sequence of upper semicomputable loss superpro-
cesses.) We ?x a universal loss superprocess K(;	; 
) in every Levin game (;	; 
);
for the Brier game we will use the shorthand KBrier. We will drop the superscript if
the game is clear from the context.
The intuition behind the universal loss superprocess K(;	; 
) is that
K(; 	; 
)(!1; : : : ; !T ) (9)
is an intrinsic measure of di.culty of prediction of a sequence !1; : : : ; !T : the loss of
no computable prediction strategy is much less than (9), but the latter can be attained
“in the limit”. The universal loss superprocess when applied to (!1; : : : ; !T )∈∗ even-
tually learns all regularities in (!1; : : : ; !T ) relevant to the on-line prediction of !1, then
!2; : : : ; ?nally !T , but this process of learning never ends: the upper semicomputabil-
ity (but not computability) of K(;	; 
) means that there always remains possibility of
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discovering new regularities in !1 : : : !T which will decrease K(;	; 
)’s estimate of
the loss attainable on !1 : : : !T .
Equipped with this generalization of Kolmogorov complexity, we can now de?ne
the notion of randomness.
Denition 15. An outcome sequence !1!2 : : : is (;	; 
)-random w.r.t. a computable
prediction strategy S if
sup
T
(LossS(!1 : : : !T )−K(;	;
)(!1 : : : !T )) ¡∞: (10)
The following proposition (proven in [23]) shows that the strong limit theorems
(strong law of large numbers, law of the iterated logarithm, and theorem of agreement;
cf. Theorems 19, 20, and 22 below) that we prove in this paper are stronger than the
usual limit theorems for sequences of events.
Proposition 16 (Vovk [23]). If a binary sequence is log-loss random w.r.t. a com-
putable prediction strategy; then it is Brier random w.r.t. that strategy.
On the other hand, it is easy to see that the log-loss randomness is di*erent from
the Brier randomness: e.g., the sequence (0; 0; : : :) is Brier random w.r.t. the prediction
strategy t =1=t, ∀t (since
∑
t t
−2 is convergent) but not log-loss random (since
∑
t t
−1
is divergent).
Our de?nition of randomness is not the only possible one. For example, one could
replace supT by lim supT→∞ in (10); it is clear, however, that this modi?ed de?nition
will be equivalent to the original de?nition. The following de?nition also looks natural.
Denition 17. An outcome sequence !1!2 : : : is weakly (;	; 
)-random w.r.t. a com-
putable prediction strategy S if
lim inf
T
(LossS(!1 : : : !T )−K(; 	; 
)(!1 : : : !T )) ¡∞: (11)
Again it turns out that this leads to the same notion, which demonstrates that our
de?nition is fairly robust.
Proposition 18 (Vovk [23]). In the log-loss game and Brier game; weak randomness
is equivalent to randomness.
Therefore, if a sequence !1!2 : : : is not random w.r.t. S, then the universal loss
superprocess beats S on it, in the sense that
LossS(!1 : : : !T )−K(!1 : : : !T )→∞ (T →∞):
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Using the algorithmic notion of randomness, we can restate some of our results in
a more intuitive way. (Theorem 19 below corresponds to Theorem 2, Theorem 20
corresponds to Theorem 5, Theorem 21 corresponds to Theorem 6, and Theorem 22
corresponds to Theorem 8.)
Theorem 19 (Strong law of large numbers). If !1!2 : : : is Brier random w.r.t. a com-
putable prediction strategy S; then property (3) holds; where t =S(!1 : : : !t−1) is
S’s prediction at trial t.
In other words, a computable prediction strategy whose predictions fail to be correct
on the average will be greatly outperformed by the universal loss superprocess.
Theorem 20 (Law of the iterated logarithm). If a sequence !1!2 : : : ∈ [0; 1]∞ is Brier
random w.r.t. a computable prediction strategy S;
lim sup
T→∞
∣∣∣∣∣
∑T
t=1(!t − t)√
T ln ln T
∣∣∣∣∣6 1√2 :
Theorem 21. There exists a computable prediction strategy S and a sequence !1!2
: : : ∈ [0; 1]∞ Brier random w.r.t. S such that
lim inf
T→∞
∑T
t=1(!t − t)√
T ln ln T
= − 1√
2
; lim sup
T→∞
∑T
t=1(!t − t)√
T ln ln T
=
1√
2
: (12)
Theorem 22 (Theorem of agreement). If the outcome sequence is Brier random w.r.t.
two computable prediction strategies; the predictions output by these strategies satisfy
(6).
The next theorem complements Theorem 22.
Theorem 23 (Criterion of randomness). Suppose the outcome sequence is Brier ran-
dom w.r.t. one of two computable prediction strategies. It is random w.r.t. the other
if and only if the predictions output by the two strategies satisfy (6).
(The analogous result for the log-loss game, proven in [17], is closely connected with
a theorem of Kabanov, Liptser, and Shiryayev in conventional probability theory.)
8. Some proofs
8.1. Aggregating Algorithm
Our main technical tool is the “Aggregating Algorithm” [18, 20]. Its role in “Brier
probability theory” is analogous to the role of Kolmogorov’s axiom of -additivity
in the usual probability theory. (For example, in the proof of Theorem 2 in the next
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subsection we will represent the complement of event (3) as the union of a countable
family of “null” events; the Aggregating Algorithm will allow us to conclude that the
whole union is also “null”.)
We will not describe the Aggregating Algorithm here (the reader can consult Vovk
[20] or Haussler et al. [7] for details) and will only state a theorem (di*erent parts
of which were proven in [6, 18, 7]) describing its properties for the two games we are
interested in. In this theorem the pool of experts is in8nite and consists of Expert 1,
Expert 2, and so on.
Theorem 24 (DeSantis et al. [6], Vovk [18] and Haussler et al. [7]). Let p1; p2; : : : be
a sequence of non-negative numbers summing to 1 (the weights of the experts).
The Aggregating Algorithm (with suitable parameters) de8nes Learner’s strategy in
the Brier (resp. log-loss) game which guarantees that; whatever Experts’ and Na-
ture’s moves; the following inequality will hold at every trial T and for every Expert
i=1; 2; : : : :
LossT (Learner)6LossT (Expert i) + a ln
1
pi
; (13)
where a= 12 (resp. a=1). (When pi =0; ln 1=pi =∞; and so (13) becomes trivially
true.)
(Of course, this theorem can be applied to a ?nite pool of experts as well: any
?nite pool of experts can be modeled as an in?nite pool in which all but ?nitely many
experts are given zero weights.)
The games for which inequality (13) can be guaranteed for some ?nite a are called
perfectly mixable (some interesting games, such as the absolute loss game, also require
a coe.cient c¿1 before LossT (Expert i)); it can be shown that perfectly mixable games
which satisfy some conditions of computability are Levin games.
8.2. Proof of Theorem 2
An event is a property of the sequence of Expert’s and Nature’s moves 1!12!2 : : : .
We will say that an event E (such as (3)) is full if Learner has a strategy L that
guarantees
E or lim
T→∞
(LossT (Expert)− LossT (L)) =∞;
where LossT (L) is de?ned in the natural way; the complement of a full event is called
null; we will say that L forces the event E. Therefore, our goal is to prove that (3)
is full. First we will simplify our task. Let us say that an event E is weakly full (and
its complement is weakly null) if Learner has a strategy L that weakly forces E, i.e.,
guarantees
E or sup
T
(LossT (Expert)− LossT (L)) =∞:
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Lemma 25. An event E is weakly full if and only if it is full.
Proof. Let E be weakly forced by Learner’s strategy L. For every C¿0 let L(C) be
the following strategy for Learner:
• before LossT (Expert)− LossT (L) reaches C, act in accordance with L;
• after that, repeat Expert’s predictions.
Mixing the strategies L(2
k ); k =1; 2; : : : ; with the Aggregating Algorithm with weights
2−k , we obtain a strategy that forces E.
So we only need to prove that (3) is weakly full. The next lemma will simplify our
task even further.
Lemma 26. If events E1; E2; : : : are full (resp. weakly full); then their intersection⋂∞
k=1 Ek is also full (resp. weakly full).
Proof. It su.ces to apply the Aggregating Algorithm to Learner’s strategies (weakly)
forcing E1; E2; : : : :
The next lemma, despite its triviality, is very important.
Lemma 27. Let L be Learner’s strategy. The event
sup
T
(LossT (Expert)− LossT (L)) ¡∞ (14)
is weakly full (and; therefore; full).
Proof. By the law of the excluded middle, the following disjunction always holds:
sup
T
(LossT (Expert)− LossT (L)) ¡∞;
or
sup
T
(LossT (Expert)− LossT (L)) =∞:
Now we can start proving the theorem. Consider Learner’s strategy Lt = t+, where
 is a constant (typically small in absolute value). (We are allowing Learner to make
predictions outside [0; 1]; this freedom does not really help Learner since the outcomes
are always in [0; 1].) Equivalent transformations of (14) give
∃C :
T∑
t=1
(!t − t)26
T∑
t=1
(!t − t − )2 + C;
∃C : 2
T∑
t=1
(!t − t)6T2 + C:
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For ¿0, this is equivalent to
∃C : 1
T
T∑
t=1
(!t − t)6 2 +
C
2T
and for ¡0, this is equivalent to
∃C : 1
T
T∑
t=1
(!t − t)¿ 2 +
C
2T
:
We can see that for any ¿0 the event
− 6 lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
(!t − t)6 lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
(!t − t)6 (15)
is weakly full. Application of Lemmas 25 and 26 concludes the proof of the theorem.
8.3. Proof of Theorem 19
To see why Theorem 19 is true, it su.ces to notice that, when Learner plays against
a computable strategy for Expert using the strategy described in the previous subsection,
which guarantees (4), the corresponding loss process is computable and so is bounded
below by KBrier to within an additive constant. (Strictly speaking, not all details of
Learner’s strategy are described in the previous subsection, but they are easy to ?ll
out.)
In the same way, proofs of Theorems 20 and 22 follow from the proofs of Theorems
5 and 8 and we do not spell them out.
8.4. Proof of Remark 3
It su.ces to merge (using the Aggregating Algorithm) Learner’s strategy that always
replicates Expert’s move with Learner’s strategy guaranteeing (4), taking the former
with weight close to 1.
8.5. Proof of Theorem 4
We have stated quite a few theorems related to the log-loss game, but we will
only prove one of them: the log-loss game is very close to the traditional probability
theory and the proofs of limit theorems for this game can usually be deduced from the
well-known proofs of the theory of martingales (cf. [19], Chapter 13 of [14], and [5]).
We give a simple proof of Theorem 4 (this proof can be elaborated, along the lines
of the proof of Theorem 5 in the next subsection, to obtain a proof of Theorem 7).
With every prediction ∈ [0; 1] we associate the probability measure P in {0; 1} which
assigns the values
P(0) = 1− ; P(1) = 
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to the points 0 and 1, respectively. Let ¿0. Consider Learner’s strategy which, at
every trial t, outputs the prediction associated with the probability distribution that
assigns the weight
Pt (!)e
(!−t)
Pt (0)e(0−t) + Pt (1)e(1−t)
to !∈{0; 1} (the denominator is just the normalizing constant). Expert’s loss over the
?rst T trials is
−
T∑
t=1
ln Pt (!t)
(for simplicity we assume in this proof that Pt (!t) is always positive) and Learner’s
loss is
−
T∑
t=1
ln
Pt (!t)e
(!t−t)
Pt (0)e(−t) + Pt (1)e(1−t)
;
so Lemma 27 implies that the event
∃C ∀T : −
T∑
t=1
ln Pt (!t)6−
T∑
t=1
ln
Pt (!t)e
(!t−t)
Pt (0)e(−t) + Pt (1)e(1−t)
+ C
is full. The last inequality can be transformed as follows:

T∑
t=1
(!t − t)6
T∑
t=1
ln (Pt (0)e
(−t) + Pt (1)e
(1−t)) + C;

T∑
t=1
(!t − t)6
T∑
t=1
ln (Pt (0)(1 + (−t) + 22t )
+Pt (1)(1 + (1− t) + 2(1− t)2)) + C
(we have assumed that 61 and used the inequality et61 + t + t2, which is true at
least for |t|61);

T∑
t=1
(!t − t)6
T∑
t=1
ln (1 + 2) + C;

T∑
t=1
(!t − t)6
T∑
t=1
2 + C
(we have used the inequality ln(1 + t)6t);
1
T
T∑
t=1
(!t − t)6+ CT :
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This and the inequality obtained in the same way with  replaced by − imply that
the event (15) is full (in the log-loss game). It remains to apply Lemma 26.
8.6. Proof of Theorem 5
First we will prove an elaboration of Lemma 27.
Lemma 28. Let Li ; i=1; 2; : : : ; be Learner’s strategies in the one-expert Brier game
and pi; i=1; 2; : : : ; be their weights: pi¿0; ∀i;
∑
i pi =1. The event
sup
i;T
(
LossT (Expert)− LossT (Li)− 12 ln
1
pi
)
¡∞
is full.
Proof. Let us mix L1;L2; : : : into one strategy L with the Aggregating Algorithm.
By Lemma 27, the event
sup
T
(LossT (Expert)− LossT (L)) ¡∞
is full. The statement of the lemma now follows from
LossT (L)6LossT (Li) +
1
2
ln
1
pi
(see Theorem 24).
Now we prove Theorem 5 by elaborating the proof of Theorem 2. First, we notice
that it is enough to prove Theorem 5 with the absolute value sign dropped. Indeed,
suppose we have a strategy that guarantees the implication
Expert is adequate⇒ lim sup
T→∞
∑T
t=1 (!t − t)√
T ln ln T
6
1√
2
: (16)
Feeding this strategy with the values 1− t in place of t and 1− !t in place of !t ,
we obtain a strategy that guarantees the implication
Expert is adequate⇒ lim sup
T→∞
∑T
t=1 (t − !t)√
T ln ln T
6
1√
2
;
combining the last two inequalities, we obtain the formula of Theorem 5.
To prove that Learner can guarantee (16), we let Li predict with t + i, where i
are positive constants to be chosen later. By Lemma 28 the following event is full:
∃C ∀i; T :
T∑
t=1
(!t − t)26
T∑
t=1
(!t − t − i)2 + 12 ln
1
pi
+ C;
∃C ∀i; T :
T∑
t=1
(!t − t)6Ti2 +
1
4i
ln
1
pi
+
C
2i
: (17)
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Let ¿0 be a small constant. Taking
i = log1+(T + 1)
(intuitively, i is an economic encoding of the approximation (1 + )i to T ),
pi = e−ci−1−
(we take as large weights as possible; e−c is a normalizing constant), and
i =
√
ln i
2(1 + )i
(this is close to the value of  that minimizes the approximation T=2 + ln ln T=4 to
the right-hand side of (17)), we rewrite the inequality in (17) as
T∑
t=1
(!t − t)6T2
√
ln i
2(1 + )i
+
1
4
√
2(1 + )i
ln i
ln (i1+) +
C
2
√
2(1 + )i
ln i
+ c:
Since, as T→∞; ln i grows as ln ln T and (1 + )i grows as T , the right-hand side
of the last inequality asymptotically does not exceed
2−1:5T (1 + )
√
ln ln T
T
+ 2−1:5
√
T
ln ln T
(1 + )ln ln T =
1 + √
2
√
T ln ln T :
Lemma 26 ensures that we can take → 0, which proves that Learner can guarantee
(16).
8.7. Strategies for Learner’s adversaries
We will need the following martingale-theoretic result (I learned it from Philip
Dawid).
Lemma 29. Let  T be a supermartingale with uniformly bounded increments. Then
lim sup
T→∞
 T =∞⇒ lim inf
T→∞
 T = −∞
almost surely. (In particular; limT→∞  T =∞ with probability 0:)
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume  0 = 0 (if necessary, replace all  T by
 T −  0). We are required to prove that the event
lim sup
T→∞
 T =∞; lim inf
T→∞
 T ¿ −∞
is null. It is su.cient to prove, for every constant C, that
lim sup
T→∞
 T =∞; ∀T :  T ¿ −C (18)
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is null. Fix C. Let  ∗ be the “stopped” supermartingale  ∗T =  min(T; !), where !=
min{t |  t6−C}. We are required to prove that the event
lim sup
T→∞
 ∗T =∞; ∀T :  ∗T ¿ −C
(which is just a di*erent expression for (18)) is null. On this event the positive super-
martingale  ∗T +C +C∗, where C∗ is an upper bound on supT¿1 | T −  T−1|, tends to
in?nity, so it is indeed null.
This lemma enables us to easily prove Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 6. Let L be Learner’s strategy. Consider Expert and Nature’s
randomized strategy under which Expert always predicts 12 and Nature chooses 0 or 1
independently with equal probabilities. Then, by the usual law of the iterated logarithm,
lim inf
T→∞
∑T
t=1 (!t − t)√
T ln ln T
= − 1√
2
; lim sup
T→∞
∑T
t=1 (!t − t)√
T ln ln T
=
1√
2
(19)
with probability 1 and, by Lemma 29,
lim
T→∞
(LossT (Expert)− LossT (L)) =∞
with probability 0. From Martin’s [13] theorem about the determinacy of quasi-Borel
games we can deduce that Expert and Nature have a deterministic strategy that guar-
antees the conjunction of
lim inf
T→∞
(LossT (Expert)− LossT (L)) ¡∞
and (19).
Proof of Theorem 21 is based on the same idea.
Proof of Theorem 21. Let, for all t; t = 12 . It is well known that, for all log-loss
random !1; !2; : : : ; (12) holds. It remains to apply Proposition 16.
8.8. Proof of Theorems 8 and 23
Proof of Theorem 8. Let Learner’s predictions be
Lt =
(1)t + 
(2)
t
2
:
Using the notation
rt = Lt − !t; t =
(1)t − (2)t
2
;
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we can write the cumulative (over the ?rst T trials) mean loss of the two experts
minus the cumulative loss of Learner as
T∑
t=1
(
1
2
((rt + t)2 + (rt − t)2)− r2t
)
=
T∑
t=1
2t :
So, when
∑∞
t=1 
2
t =∞, Learner outperforms at least one expert in the weak sense of
sup
T
(LossT (Expert)− LossT (Learner)) =∞;
an argument similar to that of Lemma 25 shows that Learner has a strategy that
outperforms at least one expert in the strong sense of
lim
T→∞
(LossT (Expert)− LossT (Learner)) =∞:
Proof of Theorem 23. We only need to prove (cf. Theorem 22) that if the two strate-
gies agree in the sense of (6), then randomness of the outcome sequence w.r.t. one of
them implies the randomness w.r.t. the other. If these two prediction strategies output
predictions (1)t and t , we consider a third prediction strategy that output predictions
(2)t satisfying
t =
(1)t + 
(2)
t
2
(we allow (2)t to take values outside [0; 1]; it is easy to see that we can do so without
invalidating the proof). We are required to prove that if (1)t and t (equivalently,
(1)t and 
(2)
t ) agree in the sense of (6) and the universal loss superprocess beats 
(1)
t ,
then the universal loss superprocess beats t . This is an immediate consequence of the
following observation: the universal loss superprocess beats (1)t and performs at least
as well as (2)t (to within an additive constant), and so the agreement between 
(1)
t
and (2)t ensures that the universal loss superprocess beats t as well (see the proof of
Theorem 8).
8.9. Strong law of large numbers is violated for the absolute-loss game
In this section we will prove that the strong law of large numbers does not hold
for the absolute-loss game, for which = {0; 1}; 	= [0; 1], and 
(!; )= |!− | (cf.
Section 9 below). Let Nature output 0 or 1 independently with equal probabilities
and Expert always predict 1. Then property (3) is violated with probability 1 and the
di*erence LossT (Expert)− LossT (L) (where L is Learner’s strategy) is a martingale
and so cannot tend to ∞ with probability 1 (see Lemma 29).
8.10. Proof of Theorem 11
An event E is C-full if Learner has a strategy L that C-forces E, in the sense that
it guarantees
E or LossT (Expert)− LossT (Learner) ¿ C:
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We are required to prove that the event∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
(!t − t)
∣∣∣∣∣6
√
C + ln 2=2
T
(20)
is C-full.
Consider the following two strategies for the Learner: at trial t; L+ recommends the
move Lt = t +  and L
− recommends the move Lt = t − ;  is a positive constant
that will be chosen later. We ascribe the same weight 12 to these two strategies and
mix them with the Aggregating Algorithm obtaining Learner’s strategy L. The event
LossT (Expert) − LossT (L)6C is C-full (cf. Lemma 27); therefore, by Theorem 24,
the intersection of the events
LossT (Expert)− LossT (L+)6C + ln 22 (21)
and
LossT (Expert)− LossT (L−)6C + ln 22 (22)
is also C-full. The calculations of Section 8.2 show that (21) implies
1
T
T∑
t=1
(!t − t)6 2 +
C + ln 2=2
2T
; (23)
setting  to
√
(C + ln 2=2)=T (so as to minimize the right-hand side of (23)), we obtain
1
T
T∑
t=1
(!t − t)6
√
C + ln 2=2
T
: (24)
Analogously, (22) implies
1
T
T∑
t=1
(!t − t)¿−
√
C + ln 2=2
T
: (25)
Therefore, the intersection of (24) and (25) is C-full. It remains to compare (24) and
(25) with (20).
9. Further research
It is plausible that at least some of our results can be proven for other speci?c
perfectly mixable games; two examples of such games are Cover’s universal portfolio
game [3] and the Kullback–Leibler game [7] (these two games, like all other popular
perfectly mixable games, are Levin games). There is also little doubt that some results
(such as the strong law of large numbers or the theorem of agreement) can be proven
for wide classes of games, and an interesting problem is to ?nd, for each of these
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results, the weakest possible conditions on a game under which that result still continues
to hold.
Even for the games which are not perfectly mixable (such as the absolute loss
game), it might be possible to prove some interesting limit theorems. The results for
such games, however, must be very di*erent from the usual set including the law of
large numbers, the law of the iterated logarithm, and the theorem of agreement (see
Section 8.9 above).
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